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This paper explores the existing arrangements for multilateral regulation of large firms,
and makes the case for balancing strengthened global corporate property rights with
more explicit and enforceable social obligations.  In a democratic market-based society,
investors have legally enforceable rights but must also obey laws designed to protect
labour, consumers and the environment, while competition regulations are designed to
counter market power and business taxes ensure the provision of public goods.
Strengthened multilateral co-operation in three related areas - investment, tax and
competition  – is under way.  Although progress is slow and contested, the distinct
interests of host and home countries are clear and the ‘development dimension’ broadly
recognised. In marked contrast, corporate conduct on labour and environmental issues is
still almost exclusively regulated at the national level. Moreover, external standards of
international corporate responsibility in developing countries are set by voluntary
initiatives at best, with market incentives rather than legal requirements constituting the
basis for compliance. A better approach would be a multilateral definition of the
obligations of international firms that is explicitly linked to the guarantee of property
rights. These obligations might reasonably include international taxation, competition
rules and stakeholder issues such as employment conditions and environmental
protection. The ongoing process of regional integration – particularly in Europe – could
present an additional opportunity for such a definition.
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1. Introduction
The process of globalisation has created an evident asymmetry in global factor markets:
there is largely free movement of goods and capital; while services and labour remain
largely confined within to national borders. Indeed, the value of the goods and services
directly delivered by these firms in foreign countries now exceeds that of global exports.
1
This means not only that large international firms have become the effective bearers of
economic globalisation, but also that the economic (and social) externalities of their
business activities have become central to economic development.  In the absence of
international legal instruments to adequately deal with international firms, global
intergovernmental institutions constrain governments which are then supposed to regulate
firms which are located in their territories – whether headquarters or subsidiary. This
creates a serious negotiating asymmetry between large firms and small countries,
particularly if powerful home country governments support ‘their’ firms.
Developed countries see little reason in principle to treat international firms
2 differently
from any large ‘domestic’ firm, who are (or potentially) multinationals in effect.
Increasingly this is also true of developing countries themselves: not only the capital
exporters such as Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; but also all middle-income countries
have their own international firms. Low income countries too – from China and India on
the one hand, the Ghana and Nicaragua on the other – have much of their capital abroad
and domestically owned firms which operate across frontiers, and thereby can escape the
regulators and – possibly more important – the tax authorities.
3  The case for international
regulation of firms no longer rests, therefore, merely on the desire to curb the power of
large multinational investors within developing countries; but from a wider agenda which
includes large domestic firms and in principle places governments north and south in
common cause.
4
Modern market regulation has been built up at the national level from the interplay of two
forces. First, the interests of the ‘firm’ (controlling shareholders and senior management)
in the growth of asset value. Second, a combination of consumer pressures, stakeholder
interests (employees, minority shareholders and local communities) and the objectives of
the state itself.  At the international level there are major complications. On the one hand,
the weakness of the international political community is mirrored by the virtual absence
of international commercial law.
5  It is far from clear – even in principle - how these
conflicts are to be resolved, and by whom. On the other hand, the national governments
involved are of unequal influence, and in particular large states such as the EU and the
US (that naturally reflect the interests of their firms, stakeholders and consumers)
effectively define both the agenda and the progress of negotiations.
                                                                
1 See UNCTAD (2000a).
2 Sometimes known as ‘foreign’, ‘international’, ‘multinational’ or ‘transnational’ firms – the point here
being that they are domiciled in one jurisdiction and operate in another, and thus come under to distinct
regulators.
3 Indeed a case can be made for considering even poor households in developing countries as ‘transnational
firms’ insofar as they have members abroad remitting funds.
4 See DfID (2000).
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This paper examines four dimensions of current negotiations on the international
regulation of international firms in order to throw some light on this problem: investment
treaties; corporate taxation; competition law; and labour/environmental codes. As a
whole they make up much of the equivalent ‘matrix’ to domestic regulatory structures,
with the possible exception of consumer protection.
6  Section 2 looks at international
investment negotiations, where the apparent conflict between ‘north and ‘south’ has been
most explicit, and the interest of ‘multinationals’ versus ‘poor countries’ (or even ‘poor
people’) seems most apparent. Rather less advanced in terms of international
negotiations, but none the less profoundly important for the future of international firm
regulation, is international tax co-ordination, which is discussed in Section 3. Section 4
explores competition rules, which have recently been taken up by the EU as the solution
to abuse of international market power –despite the lack of clarity as to principles and
procedures. These three are being pursued on an intergovernmental basis and presume (at
least in principle) a potential legal framework defining the rights and obligations of
international firms.
The current approach to labour and environmental standards on the basis of voluntary
codes is discussed in Section 5, where a contrast is drawn between the use of economic
incentives and statutory powers to achieve a socially desirable outcome. Section 6
addresses the problem of how obligations on international firms might be introduced to
match their claim for international property rights despite the political economy of the
slow and uneven progress towards the international regulation of business in general, and
their activities in developing countries in particular. Section 7 concludes.
2. International Investment Negotiations and Global Property Rights
The lack of a clear international legal infrastructure for investor protection continues to
hamper the establishment of a global market in long-term capital.
7 Investment issues are
becoming a key element of commercial relations between states, now that the basic
principles of free trade have been settled in the WTO, and the provision of services
depends upon the commercial presence of an international firm in the host market.
Among the advanced industrial countries, investment issues are settled under a number of
(non-binding) OECD instruments. However, in the late 1960s, a number of European
investor countries perceived a need to protect their assets in developing countries and
started to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with them.
                                                                
6 Although it could be argued that international agencies such as the WHO (drugs), FAO (foods) and ICAO
(air transport) do represent an embryonic form of global consumer protection.
7 For a succinct overview of the major developments in the history of international business regulation and
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BITs focus solely on investment issues and make binding provisions on expropriation,
the transfer of payments, and compensation for losses due to armed conflict or internal
disorder. These benefits may be accorded on a national treatment (NT) or Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) basis.
8  A broad definition of investment is used, covering direct
investment, portfolio holdings and non-equity forms of investment. However, protection
is only granted to investors with real links to one of the countries are parties to the
agreement. BITs usually provide for the resolution of investor-state disputes in private
institutions (such as the arbitration centres of the International Chamber of Commerce) or
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World
Bank.  However, in contrast to their specificity with respect to investment protection,
BITs usually make few commitments about liberalising investment restrictions. National
treatment rarely extends to the pre-entry phase (i.e. the right of establishment in a
particular sector) and few BITs contain provisions on investment restrictions such as
performance requirements.
9
Attempts to co-ordinate investment policies between larger groups of countries have a
mixed record of success. They have been most successful where countries are highly
interdependent in their trade and investment flows, the most notable example being the
EU Treaty of Rome. In contrast, regional trade agreements among developing countries
tend to contain only fairly rudimentary investment provisions, even in the case of
ambitious integration agreements such as Mercosur. However, there are a growing
number of preferential trade agreements between developed and developing countries
that do incorporate investment provisions. These treaties usually include commitments on
non-discriminatory treatment and disciplines on investment restrictions. The investment
provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
10 and the EU
association agreements with countries in Central and Eastern Europe are binding and
considered stringent. In contrast, the agreements between rather loose and diverse
groupings such as ASEAN and APEC are weak and usually non- binding.
The ambitious investment protection provisions included in the NAFTA served as a
blueprint for the OECD-based negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI).
11 The MAI talks were discontinued in October 1998 following opposition
developing country governments, the failure of the US and EU to agree on a number of
key issues – and widespread protests from labour and environmental groups. None the
                                                                
8 NT involves firms being treated at least as well (in terms of investment licences and trade restrictions, for
instance, but not taxation) as domestic firms, ‘under like circumstances’. MFN involves foreign firms in a
particular country being accorded conditions at least as favourable as the best enjoyed by firms from any
other country.
9 Which typically oblige foreign firms to use a certain proportion of domestic inputs, or to export more than
they import, for example.
10 The Mexican government was required to liberalise its investment policies significantly in order to
conform with the agreement, but has subsequently extended the substantive rights (in Chapter 11:A) to
foreign investors from outside North America. However, as an OECD member since 1994 it would have
had to do this in any case. There are also widespread exemptions from NAFTA disciplines, including
energy and transport sectors (Mexico), cultural industries (Canada), maritime transport (US) and
agriculture in all three countries. These exemptions have set important precedents for any future
multilateral negotiations.
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less, US negotiators continue to use NAFTA as a benchmark for any future investment
agreement negotiated at the multilateral level.  Bilateral and regional investment treaties
must in any case be consistent with the disciplines set out in the WTO agreements,
including those on competition policy. The WTO agreements already contain important
principles relating to the four main issues linked to investment (national treatment,
transparency, investor protection and dispute settlement). There is therefore some logic in
resuming multilateral investment negotiations within the WTO framework.
The existing WTO provisions on investment are scattered across a number of separate
agreements. The National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation obligations imposed on
governments by current WTO rules are worded in much the same way as the relevant
clauses in existing investment accords.
12  The treatment of foreign firms can only be
materially different from that of national firms if the situation of foreign firms is not
comparable (as is the case in many service industries and above all where domestic firms
are small and/or using traditional techniques). However, the next round of negotiations
will have to decide whether to modify the existing WTO rules so that the national
treatment obligation applies to the pre-entry phase (i.e. right of establishment), which
would go well beyond most bilateral and regional investment agreements.  Any future
investment agreement would also need to contain provisions requiring host governments
to make and enforce rules in a transparent way.
13 However, the right of national
governments and central banks to intervene in pursuit of monetary and exchange rate
stability is explicitly recognised under most bilateral investment treaties, and under the
rules of the IMF. In a payments crisis, the WTO commitments to provide foreign
exchange for firms to repatriate profits, pay royalties or service loans are not considered
to be binding.
The new trade round is thus likely to consider investment issues, but WTO members are
divided in their attitudes. The rudimentary WTO disciplines could be codified and
strengthened, but the WTO’s inability to hear disputes between states and private
investors will remain a problem for the latter. Unlike the NAFTA (and the MAI draft)
where firms can bring such cases, under bilateral agreements foreign investments may
only be expropriated for a public purpose on a non-discriminatory basis and
compensation must be prompt, adequate and effective. The draft MAI would have
extended these safeguards (following the precedent set by NAFTA) to include measures
taken by governments which have an ‘equivalent effect’ to outright expropriation.  In US
commercial law, this language has been interpreted to encompass government actions
that have reduced the commercial value of investments. The inclusion of such broad
language contributed to the failure of the MAI talks because in many jurisdictions it
would have provided a higher level of protection to foreign investors than that available
to their domestic counterparts. Environmentalists and labour rights activists argued that
such terms would prevent national governments from taking any action to uphold or
                                                                
12 For example, the clause on ‘like circumstances’ in GATS Article XVII is similar to that in NAFTA
Article 1102.
13 Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires governments to disclose all
relevant provisions affecting investment. Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS) and Article III of the GATS both contain notification requirements for investment
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introduce social and environmental safeguards if doing so would reduce the value of
foreign investments.
Any eventual WTO treaty on investment would thus be much less ambitious than the
failed OECD-based multilateral agreement, but the negotiations are nonetheless likely to
be difficult and prolonged. The aim of the negotiations would be to establish a common
set of multilateral rules providing a simplified, secure and predictable legal environment
for international investment. This is intended to be a binding multilateral framework
encompassing existing bilateral agreements and practices; it would replace existing
international agreements on investment issues. Negotiating an MFI is likely to be
extremely complicated. The substantive provisions are unlikely to go beyond requiring
national treatment for foreign investors and compensation for expropriated property.
The EU and Japan are keen to negotiate a WTO-based investment instrument, but the
United States appears to be less so, as it does not feel as free to achieve its own interests
(and those of US firms) through potential multilateral agreements as it already is through
bilateral arrangements.  Many developing countries remain opposed as the main effect
would be to require developing and transition economies to liberalise their foreign
investment regimes. However, any such agreement would need to be both flexible and
gradual, as is already the case in the investment-related aspects in the GATS.
14  It would
not prevent countries legislating in favour of certain domestic regions or targeting support
for specific sectors or firm categories, provided it did not discriminate between domestic
and foreign investors. In particular it does not limit government regulation on social,
health and environmental issues.
15  In fact, most middle-income and small poor countries
have already opened up radically in recent years. However, the two large low-income
countries of most interest to investors (India and China) continue to maintain
considerable controls on investment. Among the developed countries, Japan will also
come under pressure (particularly from the United States) to open up its commercial and
banking sectors.
The United States itself will also come under pressure during the negotiations to accept
some disciplines on its use of investment rules to secure the extraterritorial application of
US laws. The EU and Canada will presumably continue to oppose the extraterritorial
application of US laws under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (the
Helms-Burton law) and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). EU and Canadian officials
will be reluctant to conclude an investment agreement that leaves the US investments of
their own companies liable to be expropriated for extraterritorial breaches of unilateral
US trade embargoes.  However, any multilateral investment treaty will have to be ratified
by the US Senate, so the room for a compromise on extraterritoriality may be limited.
16
                                                                
14 General Agreement on Trade in Services at the WTO.
15 For instance, it permits the over-riding of patent rights (‘compulsory licensing’) in order to provide
generic drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment.
16 Washington will probably also demand a blanket exemption for national security policies, as it did in the
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3. International Taxation Co-operation
Current international capital income taxation arrangements pose particular problems for
poor countries for three reasons. First, need for a fair share of potential fiscal resources
generated by trans-border firms (both foreign and domestic) to service debt and supply
basic social services. Second, the socially inefficient consequences of tax competition
between developing countries in order to attract foreign investment, leading to declining
rates and revenues. And third, difficulties in taxing income from overseas assets held by
domestic residents, tax avoidance stimulating capital flight and loss of vital resources to
poor countries.  Developing countries also face the issue of how to balance between
maximising their share of revenues and maintaining a climate that attracts inward
investment (and retains their own investors). This involves implicit agreements on the
sharing of revenues between host and home countries as well as explicit agreements on
the methods to be adopted  (including the definition of ‘permanent establishment’).
17
Pressure for effective international co-operation to facilitate income tax collection is
increasing.  The increasing mobility of capital across national borders poses serious
problems for national fiscal authorities committed to taxing income from wealth. Co-
operation between tax officials could reduce some of these problems, but jurisdictional
disputes and bank secrecy laws in tax havens have so far blocked it. For developing
countries capturing tax revenue on the income of their own residents who have assets
overseas is a major problem too. In consequence, closer international collaboration (even
within the existing extensive network of double taxation treaties) by sharing information
and permitting joint actions could increase the fiscal resources available to developing
countries dramatically.
18 Further benefits would stem from this, including disincentives to
capital flight, increased fiscal and macroeconomic stability, and greater resources
available for poverty alleviation.
Standard theories of international taxation suggest that the tax burden should fall most
heavily on those factors of production which are least mobile, in order to maximise the
government's revenue. The process of globalisation has resulted in a significant
liberalisation of cross-border capital flows over the last two decades, but there has not
been a corresponding relaxation of the stringent rules covering the movement of natural
persons. Capital has therefore become relatively more mobile and there has been a
corresponding shift in the incidence of taxation from capital to labour as governments
have tried to maintain their income levels.
19
                                                                
17 Reducing regulatory uncertainty is more important to investing firms than the particular concessions or
incentives that a treaty may contain – which appear to be regarded as a ‘windfall gain’ rather than the basis
for long-term investment decisions.  See UNCTAD (1995).
18 See Frenkel, Rain and Sadka (1991).
19 As a result, corporate taxes account for only 8% of fiscal revenue in OECD member countries, equivalent
to just 3% of GDP. The most recent data published by the US Department of Commerce show that the rate
of income tax paid by the overseas subsidiaries of US corporations declined sharply between the mid-1980s
and the mid-1990s. On a worldwide basis, the tax rate paid on gross corporate income declined from 42%
to 28%. Since US overseas assets increased from 236 billion dollars in 1983 to 778 billion in 1996, the tax
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There are two main principles that underlie the jurisdictional basis of national tax
systems, although most countries employ a mixture of them. The source principle relates
jurisdiction to the source of income or the site of economic activity. A country will tax all
income earned from sources within its territory, whether it accrues to residents or non-
residents. Income earned abroad by residents is not taxed. The residence principle relates
jurisdiction to the residence or fiscal domicile of the earning entity. A country will tax the
worldwide income of persons (natural or corporate) resident or domiciled in its territory.
Income earned domestically by non-residents is not taxed.
Developed countries tend to adopt the residence principle, since they usually have a net
positive foreign asset position and the residence principle maximises their tax take.
Developing countries typically favour the source principle because they host significant
amounts of FDI; although a number of emerging markets such as Mexico and Argentina
have moved from source to residence taxation in an attempt to stimulate foreign
investment and capture income from their residents' overseas assets. The resulting clash
of jurisdictions and principles leads to severe problems for multinational corporations
operating in more than one jurisdiction, since they may be taxed more than once on the
same income.
Double taxation treaties attempt to counter this problem by allocating tax rights between
the country in which an individual or corporation is resident and the country which is the
source of their income or capital gains. Most double taxation treaties are modelled on
either the OECD Draft Taxation Convention/Model Tax Convention or the United
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing
Countries.
20 The model conventions are broadly similar, the main difference being that
the OECD convention favours residence taxation while the United Nations one gives
more weight to source taxation. The number of double taxation agreements (DTTs) has
increased rapidly and there are now some 1,700 such treaties in existence. DTTs were
originally between developed countries, but the recent expansion, clearly following the
course of bilateral investment treaties, is both with and between developing countries: a
third of all DDTs are between developed and developing countries, and a further sixth
between developing countries.
From the point of view of developing country revenue authorities, DTTs are the only way
to cover intra-firm transactions and thus overcome the problem of transfer pricing.
21
These, however, become ineffective if offshore centres are used as transfer pricing points
as well as for tax avoidance.  In consequence, short of a comprehensive multilateral tax
agreement, reconsideration of tax credits
22 within existing DTTs would be desirable; as
would the application of the US ‘pass-through’ principle to tax havens. Indeed, a number
                                                                                                                                                                                                
firms. The tax rate on income declined from 40% to 29% among the industrialised countries of the OECD,
while the rate in developing and transition economies declined from 45% to 27%. See FitzGerald (2001).
20 See OECD (1997) and UN (1980) respectively.
21 See Plasschaert (1994).
22 Corporation tax paid overseas can be credited against a firm’s domestic tax bill if there is a DTT in place.
The higher the proportion credited, the greater the incentive to pay tax overseas. This system thus has an
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of developing countries play a key ‘offshore’ role in the international investment process
where tax avoidance is of particular importance. No system of international tax
administration - whether multilateral or bilateral - has much meaning unless these
offshore centres are included.
Either the source or the residence principle could provide a basis for an effective system
of international tax co-operation, if it were applied uniformly. However, many of the
advanced industrial countries operate ‘world-wide’ taxation systems that combine
elements of both principles.  An international taxation system where each jurisdiction
applied a single principle (source from the point of view of most developing countries)
and tax rates were equal would be simpler for both tax administrators and multinational
firms, requiring less information and avoiding double tax problems.  However, it is
difficult to see how such a solution could be implemented in practice. The United States
is unlikely to change its own tax system simply to increase the tax take of other countries.
Prospects for reform are somewhat greater in the EU as a result of current efforts to
harmonise corporate tax rules within the single market and the emerging agreement on
the prevention of tax competition and tax evasion between member states - though even
these efforts do not provide much of a basis for international tax reform.
The most promising prospect for reforming tax administration may be provided by the
drive for better co-ordination among national tax authorities to tackle organised crime
and money laundering. Both banks and regulators have come under strong pressure to
share information on financial transactions as part of this crime-fighting effort and, in the
process, divulge the overseas assets of residents in a particular tax jurisdiction.  The
problem of tax evasion (in the sense of the failure to declare taxable income) through the
use of tax havens will not be fully eliminated until the legislative status of these havens is
reformed (especially their strongly defended secrecy rules). Most tax havens are
vulnerable to political pressure from their larger 'guarantor' states. The OECD is already
generating such momentum by pressure for the enactment of ‘black lists’ of tax havens,
which fail to meet basic disclosure and co-operation requirements vis-à-vis, other tax and
criminal jurisdictions. Investors reporting trade or financial transactions through
blacklisted jurisdictions would be required to produce detailed information and satisfy
other requirements for other tax authorities.
23
A multilateral tax agreement would not only improve the fiscal revenue position of
developing countries and reduce the attractiveness of tax incentives to foreign investors.
It would also strengthen the effort to combat money laundering and financial fraud.
However, the likelihood of an agreement on a comprehensive system of multilateral tax
administration is low.  Thus the application of DTTs in support of developing countries
(possibly as a joint EU initiative) and the extension of agreed OECD principles to non-
members (such as those on administrative assistance or harmful tax competition) are
probably the only viable basis for investment-related tax co-operation.
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4. New Proposals for Competition Rules
In a globalising world where single companies may have a very large market share in
certain sectors, there is a clear need for more effective national and international
arrangements to reinforce competition.
24 Regional laws and framework agreements on
competition policy can be an important option for smaller states, both in terms of
administrative cost and the economic circumstances.  Small countries may only be able to
sustain one firm in a sector or even in large areas of economic activity, and thus rely on
external competition to ensure a competitive domestic market.
A multilateral framework agreement on competition principles could help reinforce
effective competition by increasing predictability and strengthening confidence in the
stability and fairness of the market system.  There is a growing consensus that these
issues need to be addressed in an international context.
25 The EU and many other
governments believe that the WTO is the most appropriate forum for negotiation of an
agreement which could identify principles and modalities for co-operation on cross-
border and international matters, in particular on international cartels and restrictive
practices by multinational enterprises. The interaction between inward investment and
market structure was recognised in the services negotiations of the Uruguay Round.
26
However, the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation and the
associated agreements, understandings and declarations do not provide any generally
applicable rules for national competition policies; although a number of WTO accords
make reference to competition policy and related issues in specific contexts.
27 The EU
has proposed that negotiations on competition policy should form part of any new round
of multilateral trade talks.  However, this suggestion was strongly resisted by US officials
at the WTO Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle, on the grounds that the market
inefficiencies which a competition policy agreement might solve are not yet well defined.
The existence of hard-core international cartels could, in principle, provide the
foundation for a WTO agreement on competition issues. However, discussions of this
subject in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition
Policy have been notably short of concrete examples and, when real examples are
produced, they tend to be based on actions against international cartels launched by
national competition authorities.
                                                                
24 See Graham and Richardson (1997).
25 See OECD (1999).
26 Article VIII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) stipulates that monopolies and
exclusive service providers must not act in a manner inconsistent with WTO member obligations under the
agreement. Article IX of the GATS provides for consultations over restrictive business practices.   The
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services implemented these GATS safeguards in the
telecommunications sector when WTO members undertook specific commitments with respect to
competition policy.
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The United States and the EU established a bilateral agreement on the application of
competition law in 1991.  However, the EU-US bilateral agreement does not provide a
hopeful precedent for an effective WTO-based system. Only its procedural provisions are
binding, not the substantive ones. It does not contain binding rules on jurisdiction and it
does not preclude extra-territorial action.
28 The EU has sought to negotiate binding rules
in these areas, but its proposals have been rejected by the United States.
In the event of a merger, multinational corporations often need to obtain clearance in
several different jurisdictions. The companies would prefer to deal with one authority
rather than several.
29 There is arguably a good case for an arrangement among national
competition authorities that would allow multinational firms to seek worldwide clearance
from just one, which would then be recognised by others.  Initially, a plurilateral accord
might cover only a few major economies, but other WTO members would be free to join
if they are able to do so and see advantages in it for themselves. However, this is not what
the EU is proposing: the European Commission wants a fully multilateral agreement,
which all WTO members would be obliged to sign.
About half of the WTO member countries, mainly developing countries, do not have any
competition law at present.
30 The EU believes that many of these countries would benefit
from the adoption of competition disciplines, helping them attract foreign investment and
improve the allocation of domestic resources. A fully multilateral agreement would
require them to introduce and enforce effective competition policies. In this sense, the
European view is that a multilateral pact would force developing countries to act in their
own best interests. However, this confuses the case for persuasion with the case for
compulsion.
The provisions of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) would seem to be a fairly effective mechanism for
ensuring compliance with current and future competition decisions. Where a complaint is
made and the respondent fails to comply with the recommendations of a dispute
settlement panel, the complainant may be authorised to withdraw a commensurate
amount of concessions from the respondent.   The prospect of cross-retaliation (and the
possibility that several aggrieved WTO members would take action in concert) would be
a very effective sanction against non-compliant behaviour if international investment
rules were brought within the WTO system. However, the WTO could not offer dispute
resolution in investor-state as opposed to state-state disputes - unlike NAFTA.  WTO
provisions are only binding on governments, which are the only parties with legal
standing in dispute settlement proceedings. Even though private rights of litigation might
be desirable in extreme circumstances, it is unlikely that WTO proceedings would or
could be altered to accommodate this.
                                                                
28 Where the United States acts against alleged breaches of US antitrust law even though the breach occurs
outside the United States and all the relevant parties are foreign.
29 The so-called ‘one-stop shop’ approach – see WTO (1997b).
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The EU proposals go far beyond the restraint of extraterritorial action (principally by the
United States) in holding that all WTO members should adopt a comprehensive
competition law. There would be common approaches on anticompetitive practices with a
significant effect on international trade and investment – such as ‘hard-core’ cartels,
criteria for assessment of ‘vertical restrictions’ on suppliers or distributors, or abuses of
dominant market positions; principles for co-operation of export cartels and international
mergers.  There would also be provisions on notification, consultation and surveillance in
relation to anti-competitive practices with an international dimension as well as
exchanges of non-confidential information.  The WTO dispute settlement provisions
would be used to ensure that domestic competition law and enforcement structures are in
accordance with the provisions agreed multilaterally.
Japan and a number of developing countries (mostly in East Asia) support the EU
position, but the countries in this group may have very different reasons for supporting
competition negotiations. Moreover, US officials remain deeply hostile. The US
Department of Justice fears that a multilateral compromise would take a lowest-common-
denominator approach, diluting its own rigorous stance towards antitrust enforcement. In
contrast, the US Department of Commerce and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative are opposed to the idea of multilateral negotiations on competition policy
because they believe that Japan and several other Asian countries would use the talks to
re-open the related issue of anti-dumping law, which has been extensively used by the US
to protect its own industries from international competition. The United States will try to
ensure that this subject is kept off the agenda of any new round of negotiations.
5. Codes of Corporate Conduct
In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the pressure to regulate the business practices of firms
with global operations came from developing countries. However, the current corporate
responsibility movement and the renewed popularity of codes of conduct and other
voluntary arrangements are being driven by constituencies in the advanced economies.
31
International norms and declarations aimed at protecting the human and labour rights and
the environment include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, various protocols
drawn up by the UN and the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
32, and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. However, none of these instruments is directly
binding on companies.
33 They do impose binding obligations on governments in some
instances, but few governments have tried to enforce these undertakings on private firms.
                                                                
31 See Fatouros (1994).
32 See UN (1988) and ILO (1991).
33 An exception is the US legislation on bribes paid abroad to public officials by US corporations, although
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Moreover, the social and environmental dimensions of international investment have
become intensely controversial in recent years, mainly owing to the activities of non-
governmental organisations in campaigning against the alleged abuses of multinational
corporations.
34 It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition that transitional and
developing countries should not use the relaxation of labour and environmental standards
to attract or retain foreign investment. However, it remains far from clear how to make
obligations relating to labour and green standards binding, or subject to dispute
settlement procedures. Many countries have also expressed concerns about WTO
intrusiveness into the affairs of sovereign governments, particularly in the environmental
and health and safety areas. Nonetheless, in both the United States and to a lesser extent
in the EU, there is strong pressure from domestic legislators and labour unions to ensure
that any future agreement contains some form of safeguards in these areas.
In contrast, developing countries are determined to resist any linkage between trade
liberalisation and social issues, for both good and bad reasons. On the one hand, small
firms (which provide the bulk of employment) in developing countries would find
international standards too expensive and close down, while many poor households rely
on child labour to make ends meet. On the other hand, large firms and employers’
associations in developing countries have a clear financial interest in not applying
modern labour and environmental standards even if they could afford them, and are eager
to cite developmental reasons in their support.  They will press to keep labour and
environmental issues outside any multilateral investment agreement. WTO agreements
that will have a substantial impact on the internal economies and regulatory policies of
member countries therefore need a strong justification - either in terms of their benefits to
the trading system or in terms of gains that they will create for members which could not
be obtained unilaterally.
Developed-country governments have encouraged self-regulation by the private sector as
part of a broader effort to reduce state intervention in the economy and cut the burden of
regulation on business.  Officials are also keen on private sector initiatives as a means of
countering a political backlash against globalisation and deflecting pressure to advance
social and moral agendas more forcefully through international institutions with proven
enforcement powers - notably the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. For the business
sector, voluntary undertakings to improve environmental and social practices are not so
much proactive measures as a defensive move to forestall emerging demands from social
groups for governments to step in with mandatory regulation.
35
The OECD has recently completed a revised version of its 1991 Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, which contain standards and principles of good conduct for
international businesses.
36 The 1976 Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member
Countries on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was intended to
                                                                
34 See UNCTAD (1999a).
35 Corporations often feel compelled to offer voluntary commitments in the wake of accidents, scandals and
other negative publicity, such as the accidental release of toxic chemicals from a Union Carbide subsidiary
plant in Bhopal (India) in 1984, the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, and allegations that Shell Oil
was complicit in environmental and human rights abuses in Nigeria.
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improve the climate for inward investment.  It also sought to encourage multinational
enterprises to make a positive contribution to the countries in which they operate. All
OECD members, as well as some non- OECD countries and the EU have subscribed to
the declaration. It consists of four elements each underpinned by an OECD Council
decision. The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are one of these elements (others
deal with the treatment of foreign enterprises by governments and the avoidance of
conflicting requirements on multinational firms).
However, observance is voluntary and not legally enforceable. The 2000 guidelines cover
a range of issues, including employment and industrial relations, disclosure of
information, science and technology, and environmental protection. The relationship
between business and the environment received only limited attention in the 1991 version
of the guidelines, which were drawn up at a time when the nature of the relationship was
not thought to be particularly problematic. Enterprises were simply advised to ‘take due
account of the need to protect the environment and avoid creating environmentally
related health problems’.
The 2000 version illustrates just how far the business and environment debate has moved
in the last ten years. The proposals have been influenced by international negotiations,
growing public concern about the environment and possible future environmental
problems.  The second draft emphasises the importance of sustainable development, in
both the general introduction and the specific section on the environment. The guidelines
argue that multinational enterprises have a vital role to play in achieving this goal: they
are encouraged to adopt an environmental management system (EMS), reflecting the
growing interest throughout the 1990s in EMS standards such as ISO14001. The overall
message is that environmental responsibility is good business practice and makes
financial sense, so that there is no fundamental conflict between the activities of
multinational enterprises and environmental protection.
However, a more detailed reading of the guidelines reveals major problems. The OECD
commitment to the interests of multinational enterprises is clear in the draft guidelines,
and although consultation is endorsed, a wider agenda of participation is not. It is clear
that in this area the OECD has not engaged with those campaigners who have been
arguing that companies should involve a wider variety of stakeholders meaningfully in
decision-making. The draft is equally cautious in the area of scientific and technological
risks. It suggests that decision-making should be based on ‘foreseeable’ impacts and a
‘scientific and technological understanding of risks’. Where there are potential risks it
argues that multinational enterprises should ‘not use the lack of full scientific certainty as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent or reduce such damage’. This
is a very weak version of the precautionary principle.
The damage to a firm's reputation, the need to improve community relations in host
countries and the prospect of more stringent government regulation can all provide
companies with a powerful incentive to overhaul their business practices.
37  Nevertheless,
                                                                
37 For example, the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) negotiated a code of conduct
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businesses hope that such commitments will reduce the pressure on governments to
regulate industry directly, or use trade sanctions, enforced by the WTO, to underpin
labour and environmental rights. Corporations with international operations remain
strongly opposed to attempts to make international trade conditional on the observance of
minimum standards of environmental protection and labour rights. Voluntary codes are
not considered to be a substitute for legislation at the national level, but may be attractive
to large international firms at the international level in order to reduce pressure from
international activists. The main incentive appears to be the protection of brand value.
However, until companies that make commitments to socially responsible production can
point to more tangible rewards, the business community's attitude towards such
commitments will remain somewhat ambivalent. Private approaches to social regulation
try to work through the market mechanism by providing companies with a financial
incentive to improve working and environmental conditions in developing countries. The
assumption is that if demand and consumption patterns can be changed in favour of
goods produced or sourced in a socially responsible way, the marketplace will induce
manufacturers to provide what consumers want. The actual impact which private
regulation initiatives (such as labelling schemes) have on the market depends thus on the
general level of issue awareness among consumers and investors, and their willingness to
make respect for human rights, labour standards and environmental protection relevant
criteria in their purchasing decisions.
Activism by non-governmental organisations, calls for product boycotts by consumer
associations and media coverage of corporate misbehaviour have all contributed to a
higher level of consumer awareness and helped mobilise the public to use its purchasing
power in favour of socially responsible conduct. Activists have also begun to use
sanctions against companies that have subscribed to social and environmental principles
and then failed to implement them in practice. In addition to generating negative publicity
and organising consumer boycotts, activists have forced the exclusion of member
companies from trade associations and even instituted legal proceedings under laws
protecting consumers from false advertising.  Nonetheless, this activism has had much
less market impact than the mass consumer reaction to concerns about the safety of
genetically modified organisms, which has had a major adverse impact on the sales of
companies that produce GM foods or retailers that put GM produce on their shelves.
There is only limited empirical data comparing the performance of socially responsible
companies with their more conventional counterparts. Empirical studies suggest that
socially responsible behaviour can be translated into a competitive advantage more
readily in countries where there is a generally high level of awareness among the
population about social and environmental issues. In countries like Sweden, where there
is strong support for environmental protection, products carrying an environmental label
seem to have gained market share at the expense of unlabelled ones. Labels presumably
                                                                                                                                                                                                
subcontractors in the soccer industry, after the sports body was confronted with evidence that children
under the age of 14 were being employed in Pakistan to stitch soccer balls. Adidas, Mattel and other well-
known producers of toys, apparel and sporting goods have made enhanced commitments about labour
standards after being implicated in child labour and sweatshop scandals in developing countries.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS64 Page 16
help companies capitalise on their environmental responsibility and turn it into market
share because they allow consumers to identify and recognise environmentally friendly
products quickly and easily. However, in some countries, labelling schemes have not had
any discernible effect on market share. Even in countries where labelling schemes have a
significant effect, eco-labelled products still have only have a niche position.
38
A small but rapidly growing number of US investment funds now screen companies for
their corporate environmental practices and how they treat their employees worldwide (a
practice usually referred to as ethical or social screening).
39  Socially responsible
investing has also attracted attention in Canada, the United Kingdom and other European
countries. Funds that pick companies on ecological and other ethical criteria have
generally performed well, but they seldom show higher returns than unspecialised ones.
Shareholders have become more active in demanding greater transparency and
accountability about labour and environmental practices. However, there is no sign that
ethical investors have reached the critical mass and level of organisation that would
enable them to influence equity prices, either by forcing down the stock prices of
companies with poor practices, or rewarding socially responsible companies with a
higher market valuation.
6. The Prospects for Change
In sum, codes of conduct (and by implication all voluntary initiatives) have two
weaknesses. First they should cover the entire sector to be effective, in order to prevent
the ‘free rider’ problem, and this must contain an element of compulsion. Second, there
must exist some plausible penalty for breaking rules – these can only be applied by
governments or by legislation that empowers civil organisations such as trade
associations to apply such penalties.  In other words, there is a need for international
standards on labour and environment to be supported by intergovernmental agreements –
as property rights, tax liability and competition rules are (however imperfectly) – if they
are to be effective. Reliance on the presumed effect on asset (brand) value of consumer
awareness of production conditions in developing countries is hardly sufficient.
There is thus no doubt that some form of international regulation of international business
is necessary.  However the process of constructing a global regulatory system is slow and
lopsided. The interests of corporations are backed by major states, which are also under
pressure also from their own consumers, unions and NGOs. Any progress will be the
                                                                
38 The market share for ‘fairly traded’ goods (usually commodities and craft items carrying a logo
certifying that they are sourced directly from poor producers in developing countries) is also relatively
limited. In Europe a small market share has been established, but is mainly based on solidarity rather than
quality; while in North America, these products are only slowly making their way into supermarkets.
39 In the United States, the inflow into ethical investment funds has risen by more than 80% since 1997:
about 20% (some US$ 2 trillion) of all investment fund assets took this form in 1999. In Japan, the first
investment trust specialising in firms with high environmental management standards was introduced in
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result of conflictive negotiations between the US and the EU, with developing country
interests (particularly those of smaller poor countries) being marginal. Developing
countries’ voice could be stronger with a clearer view and united front, although they too
respond to domestic conflicts between business and other interests.
Property rights are likely to be strengthened through future WTO rules, although these
are unlikely to include the right to establishment or the right to appeal directly to
international tribunals. A reasonable basis for approaching this topic is that if property
rights are to be guaranteed internationally, then so should ‘property obligations’ as well.
The EU initiative to include investment in the Millennium Round with an explicit
‘development dimension’ thus presents a vital opportunity to define what would be in
effect a ‘global social contract’, rather than merely negotiating a set of concessions on
transition arrangements for developing country accession to agreed investment
disciplines.
40  The linkage to the accepted need for co-operation on tax and competition
issues should be made explicit. However, the logical step of establishing multinational
corporations as judicial persons under international law is still a long way off, despite the
institutional reality of the global economy.
41
The danger, of course, is that not only are these property rights not balanced by
obligations as they are at the national level, but also that some of these rights may in fact
be undermining social, labour or environmental standards – that is rights claimed by other
groups in society.
Tax co-operation is driven by the need of OECD states to maintain their fiscal base on the
one hand, and the desire to combat international crime on the other. However, developing
countries have much to gain from a multilateral system, in terms of both greater income
from multinational firms and the effective taxation of their own capital base. The
negotiating problem here is how to adapt a developed country initiative to a development
objective. In the longer term, international tax rules would help to regulate transnational
firms, through both the collection and exchange of information and the potential for the
design of potential developmental incentives. Here again, the process of fiscal
harmonisation and co-operation within the EU has led to both the political initiative and
the administrative model for wider international tax co-ordination, from which
developing countries could benefit substantially.
International competition rules are at an early stage, although they are clearly needed for
highly concentrated global sectors such as telecommunications, airlines or even banking.
The interest of developing countries (particularly the larger ones) is not entirely clear, as
competition rules would expose their own companies to more competition. None the less,
such rules would provide a sound basis for regulating large international firms in an
effective monopoly situation in smaller economies.  Again, the dynamic for such rules is
provided by negotiations between the USA and the EU, with key developing county
players such as India and China still taking a bilateral rather than multilateral approach to
the issue.
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In this light, the present ‘voluntary’ approach to codes of conduct on labour and
environmental issues is somewhat anomalous. The fear of loss of asset value may be an
effective constraint on companies with significant brand image and a large consumer base
in the US or the EU, but it cannot be used as a general principle. In particular, this does
not seem to be an appropriate basis for regulating large national firms in developing
countries. Moreover, relying on consumers in northern markets to ensure the compliance
of all international firms in the south would mean that the pattern of enforcement would
be variable over time and inconsistent between sectors and countries.
Voluntary approaches even within developed countries have a number of drawbacks from
a public policy perspective.  The most significant problem with using voluntary
instruments is that it is not possible to guarantee the desired outcomes. For this reason,
voluntary instruments are unlikely to be used in situations that involve serious public
health issues or where urgent action is needed and targets must be reached quickly.
Moreover, free-riding firms that benefit from the scheme without bearing its costs can
undermine the integrity of most voluntary instruments. Covenants between industry
sectors and public authorities may thus only be useful where there is a strong trade
association that can deliver the involvement and compliance of its members, or where a
sector comprises a small number of large firms and peer pressure can achieve the same
objective.
An alternative to multilateral regulation of firms that is often proposed by activists is that
domestic legislation in OECD countries should be introduced in order to require
multinational firms headquartered there to observe certain standards of conduct.
42 The
only advantage of this approach would be that local lobbying might produce results in the
short term. However, there are at least three serious disadvantages to this approach. First,
this would lead to different legislation in each home OECD country, and thus varying
standards applied by the corresponding foreign forms in any one host developing country.
Second, multinational firms could easily avoid such domestic legislation by moving their
legal head office offshore. This problem underlines the need for fiscal action against
offshore centres discussed above. Third, there seems no reason to apply high standards to
the affiliates of multinational firms in developing countries, but not to apply them to
domestic firms of similar size which usually have much more impact on local
stakeholders – and often apply even lower standards. In sum, the logical approach would
be to adopt multilateral legislation, and then to exempt small firms on a national basis
under the ‘like circumstances’ principle where appropriate.
The necessary linkage between private property rights with social obligations to both the
state (ie taxation to provide public goods) and local stakeholders (workforce and local
community) is recognised and applied in all modern democratic market economies.
43
Construction of a similar international linkage is still a long way off in the future and
would have to overcome the hurdle of recognising the existence of firms as juridical
                                                                
42 See, for instance, Mayne (1999).
43 Indeed, under the feudal system ownership of land was conditional upon the provision of military service
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persons in international law. None the less, there are some signs of progress in the
recognition of international firms as subjects of international law. This is most apparent
in the area of corruption and narcotics, where extraterritorial legislation implies the
recognition of foreign firms. There is also a precedent in the access of firms to
intergovernmental dispute procedures in a number of plurilateral treaties. Finally, some
elements of international customary law also place obligations on corporations in areas
such as the abuse of human rights.
The importance of the EU to this debate is that these issues have to be defined explicitly
between member countries as economic, social and policy integration proceeds and even
accelerates. There is then a presumption that these international principles should be
applied more widely, to the benefit of developing countries. In the coming decade, the
economic recovery of the EU and Japan relative to the US on the one hand, and the
increasing regional co-operation with Europe, Asia and the Americas on the other, should
both create an opportunity for this type of discussion.
7. Conclusions
It is clearly incorrect to regard large international firms as effectively ‘unbridled’. There
already exist strong measures between OECD countries to regulate these firms in the
fields of investment rights, tax burdens and competition rules. The problem is these
systems have not yet been extended to cover developing countries in a way that supports
development. There is thus an urgent need to define what a desirable regulatory regime
might look like from the point of view of both middle-income and low-income
developing countries.
There are sufficient elements already in place to support a practical argument for a
comprehensive multilateral approach to the regulation of international firms. This would
balance the interest of large international firms in the protection of property rights and
simpler merger procedures on the one hand, with those of governments in tax and
competition policy, and those of local stakeholders in labour and environmental standards
on the other.  This would be of particular benefit to the least developed countries that are
still effectively excluded from international investment flows.
44
In terms of the international political economy of change, much depends upon the
response of the major powers to globalisation itself. The EU in particular has had to work
out the cross-border regulatory rules (‘mutual recognition agreements’) and social
obligations  (the ‘aquis’) that affect corporations within the Single Market, and is thus in
the best position to take this issue forward – albeit slowly.  Meanwhile, thinking about
what type of international business regulation would be in the interest of developing
countries in general and poor households in particular is a worthwhile exercise. The
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ability to draw on ongoing progress in the three fields of global regulation based on
international law would provide a far more realistic basis for debate than voluntary
initiatives based on business ethics and brand image.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS64 Page 21
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